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Abstract
We are living in an increasingly globalized world yet with con-
stant and endless conicts among countries. While studies have un-
covered the impacts of various economic factors and policy regimes on
trade and investment, a much less understood issue is whether conicts
among countries have any, especially long-lasting, impacts on cross-
border trade and investment. In this paper, we exploit one of the most
important conicts of the 20th century between what are currently the
worlds second and third largest economies, the Japanese invasion of
China from 1937 to 1945, to investigate its long-run impact on con-
temporary trade and investment between the two countries. We nd
that Chinese regions that su¤ered more severe damage in the Japanese
invasion are both less likely to trade with and trade less with Japan.
Consistently, we also nd that Japanese multinationals are less likely
to invest in Chinese regions that su¤ered greater numbers of casual-
ties during the Japanese invasion. Our study shows that historical
animosity still matters for international trade and investment, despite
the trend toward a at world.
Keywords: Sino-Japanese War; Trade; Foreign Direct Investment
JEL Codes: F1; D74; F21; F23
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1 Introduction
We are living in an increasingly globalized world with substantial cross-border
trade and investment due to the dramatic reduction in trade barriers and
advancements in communications and logistics. Yet we have also witnessed
constant and endless conicts among countries, or even the so-called clash of
civilizations. While existing research in international economics has uncov-
ered the impacts of various economic factors and policy regimes on trade and
investment, a much less understood issue is whether conicts among countries
have any, especially long-lasting, impacts on cross-border trade and invest-
ment.1 In this paper, we exploit one of the most important conicts of the
20th century between the current worlds second and third largest economies,
the Japanese invasion of China from 1937 to 1945, to investigate its long-run
impacts on contemporary trade and investment between the two countries.
The Japanese invasion of China from 1937 to 1945 was an important
part of the Pacic Front of the Second World War, but lasted longer than
the Second World War (1939-1945). It was also a very cruel war, with China
su¤ering an estimated total of 35 million military and non-military casualties
(both dead and wounded) and an estimated total of US$383 billion property
losses (see Section 2 for details). The heavy losses China su¤ered during
the war, and more importantly, the apparent lack of sincere remorse for war
crimes on the Japanese side have made this war a major obstacle to improving
bilateral relations between the two peoples and their respective governments.
Even though six decades have passed since the Japanese invasion of China
came to an end, there remains great antagonism among the Chinese people
toward the Japanese invasion as reected in both traditional and modern
media, such as movies and internet forums. According to a Pew Global
Attitudes Project report released in September 2006,2 roughly seven in ten
Chinese people dislike Japan.3 Much of the antipathy among Chinese people
toward Japan is rooted in the long memory of the Japanese invasion of the
1930s and 1940s. Eighty one percent of the Chinese surveyed believed Japan
had not apologized adequately for the war atrocities it committed against
the Chinese people during the 1930s and 1940s.
1Recently, there emerge a few studies examining the impact of conicts on trade
(Blomberg and Hess, 2006; Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig, 2008; Glick and Taylor, 2010).
We will discuss the the relation of our work with these studies later in this section.
2See Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another, available on-
line at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/249/publics-of-asian-powers-hold-negative-views-of-
one-another.
3An equal proportion of the Japanese hold an unfavorable view of China because of its
growing economic and military strength and its repeated criticism of the Japanese attitude
toward the Sino-Japanese War six decades ago.
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To identify the impact of the Japanese invasion on bilateral trade and
investment, we require variations in the severity of damage caused by the
Japanese invasion and hence the seriousness of the sequelae of the war across
Chinese regions. To that end, we use the percentage of civilian casualties
caused by the Japanese invasion across Chinese regions. More serious war
damage is expected to generate more acute sequelae of war that persist to
the present, which would deter bilateral trade and investment.4 Specically,
from Chinas Damage during World War II, we collect the province-level
data on the number of civilians who su¤ered minor wounds, sustained major
wounds or died due to the Japanese invasion; from the Statistical Abstract
of the Republic of China, we obtain the pre-war total population of each
Chinese region. The percentage of civilian casualties is thus calculated as
the ratio between the two. The outcome variables in our study concern
bilateral trade between Chinese regions and Japan, and direct investment by
Japanese multinationals in Chinese regions. Specically, we obtain data on
trade from China Customs Data in 2001 and data on direct investment from
the survey of foreign-invested enterprises conducted by the National Bureau
of Statistics of China in 2001.
To examine the impact of the Japanese invasion of China on trade be-
tween Chinese regions and Japan, we employ a two-stage estimation method
developed by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), in which the rst-stage
estimation focuses on the likelihood of trade (or the extensive margin) and
the second-stage estimation centers on the trade volume (or the intensive
margin). Specically, this method tackles both the selection bias caused by
zero bilateral trade ows and the omission of rm heterogeneity in the con-
ventional gravity model. To examine the impact of the Japanese invasion on
location choices made by Japanese multinationals in Chinese regions, we use
the discrete choice model developed by McFadden (1974) with controls for
determinants found to be important in the literature (e.g., cost of production,
market size, agglomeration, economic institutions).
We nd that those regions of China that su¤ered greater war damage and
4One may note that there has been signicant trade between Japan and China and
massive direct investment by Japanese multinationals in China since China adopted the
open-door policy in 1978. Nevertheless, if we examine the relative performance of trade
and investment between Japan and China, we can still detect some signs of weak growth
in the past decade. For example, though the China-Japan trade ow grew at an average
annual rate of 14.4% in 2001-10, it is far below the annual growth rate of 21.2% for Chinas
total trade volume in the period (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Blue Book on the
Japanese Economy, 2010). Meanwhile, the rate of growth in Japanese direct investment
in China has lagged behind that in total foreign direct investment (FDI) in China (Liu
Changli, The Retrospect, Prospects and Strategies in Japanese FDI in China, Studies of
Foreign A¤airs, Vol. 3, 2011).
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its sequelae are less likely to engage in trading with Japan (the extensive-
margin e¤ect) and trade less intensively (the intensive-margin e¤ect). Specif-
ically, if there had been no Japanese invasion of China, in 2001, there would
have been 1,956 more Chinese rms trading with Japan, and the trade vol-
ume with Japan of existing Chinese exporters and importers would have
increased by US$4.5 billion. Note that this number represents a lower-bound
estimation of the per-year trade volume loss due to the Japanese invasion of
China. The actual annual losses in trade volume would be certainly much
larger, taking the potential trade volume generated by missingrms into
account. Moreover, the trade losses have been accumulated over more than
six decades. In view of the cumulative loss in trade volume from 1945 (the
end of the Japanese invasion) to 2001 and beyond, the Japanese invasion of
China has caused a far greater trade loss between China and Japan.
These results are robust to various sensitivity checks such as alternative
specications of the rst-stage estimation, the progressive inclusion of refer-
ence countries, and a more disaggregated product-level estimation.
Consistently, we also nd that Japanese multinationals are less likely to
invest in those regions of China that su¤ered greater casualties during the
Japanese invasion. Specically, we nd that if there had been no Japanese
invasion, the probability of Japanese multinationals investing would have
increased by 10%. This result is robust to various sensitivity checks such as
the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption of the discrete choice
model, counterfactual analysis to examine potential omitted variables bias,
a sub-sample of rms established in 2001 to check for the sample selection
bias, and sub-samples of joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Bilateral trade and investment may have remained depressed for a short
period after the war because of the destruction of production capacity and
trading opportunities, the costs and inconvenience of postwar reconstruction,
etc. Our study suggests that war damage may produce chronic sequelae that
take much longer to heal. Such persistent sequelae of war can adversely a¤ect
bilateral trade and investment. In Section 5.3, we discuss possible mecha-
nisms by which the war may have exerted long-term impacts on bilateral
trade and investment. In general, our study shows that past wars might
still exert negative e¤ects on economic globalization. If the Chinese and the
Japanese could turn over the historically rooted dark page they continue to
face, their bilateral trade and investment might well reach a much higher
level.
Our study is part of an emerging stream of literature examining the im-
pact of conicts on bilateral trade (Blomberg and Hess, 2006; Martin, Mayer,
and Thoenig, 2008; Glick and Taylor, 2010). In comparison with the three
aforementioned studies investigating multiple and di¤erent types of conicts,
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our analysis focusing on one major war between two countries avoids the
problem of comparability across di¤erent conicts. In addition, cross-region
variations in war damage and its sequelae within China enable us to avoid dif-
culties in controlling for bilateral trade resistance in cross-country analysis
(such as non-tari¤ trade barriers), and therefore isolate the long-run impact
of the Japanese invasion. Moreover, instead of using the conventional gravity
model adopted in the three aforementioned studies, we employ the two-stage
estimation method recently developed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein
(2008) to correct for sample-selection bias and the omission of rm hetero-
geneity in the identication process. Finally, we examine long-lasting, rather
than contemporary or short-run, impacts of conicts on not only bilateral
trade, but also direct investment.
Our paper is also related to Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) in examining
the impact of historical events on current trade. Specically, Head, Mayer,
and Ries (2010) study the e¤ect of independence on post-colonial trade, and
nd that it has little short-run e¤ect but leads to a signicant long-run decline
in trade between colonizers and colonies. Furthermore, our study is based on
within-country and cross-region analysis, whereas theirs is a cross-country
one, and the nature of historical events examined in their study (i.e., termi-
nation of colonial ties) is di¤erent from that of ours (i.e., war).
Our study also contributes to the literature on the location choice of for-
eign direct investment by being the rst to examine the possible impact of
historical conicts on cross-border capital ow. Existing studies focus al-
most exclusively on the impacts of economic factors such as size of market,
cost of operations, degree of agglomeration, and quality of economic insti-
tutions. Our study highlights the impacts of non-economic factors such as
conicts among nations in accounting for the location choice of foreign direct
investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the historical background of the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945.
Section 3 lays out the estimation specications used to identify the impact of
the Japanese invasion of China on both bilateral trade between Chinese re-
gions and Japan and direct investment from Japanese multinationals. Data
and variables are described in Section 4, while empirical ndings are pre-
sented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Historical Background
The Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s is referred to as the
Second Sino-Japanese War in the West.5 From 1937 to 1941, China fought
Japan alone. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the war
became a major front of the Pacic War in World War II. This was the largest
Asian war in the 20th century,
The breakout of the War was by no means a historical accident. Japan
had aimed to dominate China politically and militarily to secure its abun-
dant economic resources. Military conicts in the form of small and localized
engagements between China and Japan started in 1931. In September 1931,
Japan invaded Manchuria immediately after the Mukden Incident, and es-
tablished the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 by installing Puyi, the last
emperor of Imperial China, as a puppet ruler. Incessant ghting ensued.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937 marks the beginning of
the Second Sino-Japanese War. In other words, the Sino-Japanese military
conict entered the stage of total war. Unlike Japan, China had little mil-
itary and industrial strength to undertake a full-scale war. Consequently,
the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) easily defeated the poorly equipped Chi-
nese army and captured Beijing and Tianjin. To prove their ability to ght
the IJA and then win support from the U.S. and other foreign nations, the
Kuomintang (KMT) central government led by Chiang Kai-shek started a
erce battle with the IJA in Shanghai in August 1937. After over three
months of cruel ghting, the IJA eventually captured Shanghai; nonetheless,
the Chinese demonstrated to the world their determination to defend their
territories.
Encouraged by the hard-won victory in Shanghai, the IJA captured the
KMT capital of Nanjing and southern Shanxi by the end of 1937. After the
fall of Nanjing on December 13, 1937, up to 300,000 Chinese were estimated
to become the victims of mass murder in the astonishing Nanjing Massacre,
also known as the "Rape of Nanjing". In October 1938, the IJA captured the
city of Wuhan, the political, economic and military center of China at that
time. The KMT central government was forced to retreat to Chongqing to set
up a provisional capital. At the same time, the IJA launched massive air raids
on civilian targets in the provisional capital of Chongqing and other major
cities in the unoccupied areas, leaving millions dead, injured and homeless.
By 1941, Japan occupied much of northern and coastal China, but the
KMT central government and military continued their resistance in the west-
5The 1894-95 war between the two countries is referred to as the rst Sino-Japanese
war, which took place exclusively in two coastal regions of northeastern China and involved
minimal and mostly military casualties (an estimated total of 31,500 soldiers died).
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ern interior, while the Chinese communists kept control of base areas in
Shaanxi. Due to the stubborn Chinese resistance, Japan su¤ered tremen-
dous casualties and failed to conquer China in a manner resembling the fall
of France and western Europe to Nazi Germany.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Sino-Japanese war
was merged into the Pacic Front of World War II. Nonetheless, foreign aid
was extremely limited because sea routes to China and the Yunnan-Vietnam
Railway had been closed since 1940. Most of Chinas own industrial base had
already been captured or destroyed by Japan. Despite the severe shortage
of resources and materials, in 1943, the Chinese were successful in repelling
major Japanese o¤ensives such as the Battle of Western Hubei and the Battle
of Changde.
The Second Sino-Japanese War came to an end in 1945. In the spring
of 1945, the Chinese military launched o¤ensives and retook Hunan and
Guangxi. In August, the U.S. dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and the Soviet Union attack on the IJA in Manchuria hastened the
Japanese surrender. The o¢ cial surrender was signed on September 2, 1945.
The eight-year Second Sino-JapaneseWar caused tremendous losses to the
Chinese people. O¢ cial Chinese statistics put Chinas civilian and military
casualties at 20 million dead and 15 million wounded in the 1937-45 period.6
Most Western historians believe that the total number of casualties was at
least 20 million.7 According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7
million civilians died in a single episode, i.e., the Three Alls Policy kill
all, loot all, burn all  operation implemented in May 1942 in northern
China.8 The war also wreaked havoc on the Chinese economy. Property
losses su¤ered by the Chinese were estimated to be at US$383 billion based
on the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the GDP of
Japan at that time.9
The huge number of Chinese casualties in the War were a result of mas-
sive killings and other severe war crimes committed by the Japanese military
forces against millions of civilians and prisoners of war. According to doc-
uments produced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
the Japanese military carried out a wide variety of war crimes that encom-
passed mass killings, human experimentation and biological warfare, the use
of chemical weapons, torturing of prisoners of war, cannibalism, forced labor,
6See Remember Role in Ending Fascist War. Chinadaily.com.cn, August 15, 2005.
7See Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan, Bbc.co.uk.
8Himeta, Sanko sakusen towa nan dataka-Chogokujin no mita Nihon no senso, Iwanami
Bukuretto 1996, p.43.
9See Ho Ying-chin (1978), Who Actually Fought the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945?
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comfort women (sexual slaves in military brothels), and looting.10
The war has created a permanent scar on the heart of the Chinese people,
partly because of the atrocities committed by the Japanese military during
the war, and more importantly because of the lack of sincere remorse for the
war crimes on the Japanese side. Although China and Japan normalized their
diplomatic relations in 1972 and there have been several episodes indicating
warm bilateral relations in recent decades, the war still remains a primary
point of contention and a stumbling block to Sino-Japanese relations. War-
related issues include Japanese textbook controversies, Japanese denial of
war crimes, and the political visits of top Japanese government o¢ cials to the
Yasukuni Shrine allegedly housing the souls of war criminals.11 In the case
of Japanese textbook controversies, Japanese nationalists have attempted
to whitewash actions of the Japanese military during WWII that generated
controversial content in government-approved history textbooks used in the
secondary education system of Japan. Japanese o¢ cials and nationalists
also often downplay or even deny war crimes alleged to have been committed
by the Japanese military. China and Japan continually debate the actual
number of people killed in the Nanking Massacre. China claims that at
least 300,000 civilians were killed, whereas Japan argues the number was
far lower. Some Japanese nationalists even claim that the Rape of Nanking
did not even occur. A number of Japanese o¢ cials and nationalists have
denied that comfort women operated as sexual slaves and that biological
and chemical weapons were used by troops such as those in Unit 731 during
the war. Top Japanese government o¢ cials have often visited the Yasukuni
Shrine, a memorial dedicated to the soldiers and others who died ghting on
behalf of the Emperor of Japan. These disputes and actions have been viewed
by the Chinese and other nations that su¤ered in WWII as a clear indication
of a lack of remorse for war crimes in Japan. On various occasions, these
controversies have refreshed war memories and stirred up an unfavorable
view of Japan, or have even fostered a sense of enmity against Japan among
the Chinese people. In recent years, the rising level of Chinese nationalism
incited or tolerated by the Chinese Communist government has reinforced the
anti-Japanese sentiment among a large segment of Chinese society, which has
aggravated the sequelae of the war.
10Please refer to Japanese War Crimesin Wikipedia for detailed information.
11Numerous WWII war criminals are listed in its Symbolic Registry of Divinities.
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3 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we lay out our estimation specications for the long-run
impacts of the Japanese invasion of China on bilateral trade between Chinese
regions and Japan, and of investment by Japanese multinationals in Chinese
regions, and discuss several related estimation issues.
3.1 Trade
3.1.1 Estimation Model
To examine the long-run impact of the Japanese invasion of China on bilat-
eral trade between Chinese regions and Japan, we employ the two-stage esti-
mation specication developed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008).
Specically, assume that the representative consumer in place l has the fol-
lowing utility
Ul =
JlX
j=1
lj ln
Z Nlj
0
ylj(i)
jdi
 1
j
; (1)
where l = fr; fg, in which r represents a Chinas province-level region and
f represents a foreign country, including in particular Japan; j represents a
product category with a total of Jl product categories, and i represents a
variety within product category j with a total of Nlj varieties; j < 1 is the
elasticity of substitution across varieties within product category j, assumed
to be constant across places, and ylj(i) is the consumption of variety i within
product category j in place l; and lj < 1 is the weight of expenditure spent
on product category j by consumers in place l. As products are symmetric,
j is left out hereon.
Given the utility function (1), we can derive place ls demand function
for variety i as
yl(i) =
lEl
P 1 "l
pl(i)
 "; (2)
where El is the total expenditure in place l; "  11  > 1; and Pl =hR Nl
0
pl(i)
1 "di
i 1
1 "
is the aggregate price index in place l, with pl(i) rep-
resenting the price for variety i in place l.
Under the setting of monopolistic competition, di¤erent rms produce
di¤erent varieties. Hence, variety i corresponds to rm i. Some of the product
varieties are produced locally, whereas others are imported from other places.
Assume that rm i in place l produces one unit of output at a constant
marginal cost clai, where cl is the place-specic cost reecting di¤erences in
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factor prices across places, and ai is a rm-specic productivity level captur-
ing the heterogeneity among rms in the same place. It is assumed that ai is
drawn from a cumulative distribution function G(:) with support

aLl ; a
H
l

,
where aHl > a
L
l > 0.
If rm i of place l sells only in place l, there is no additional cost. However,
if it exports to another place, say l0 6= l, it needs to pay two additional costs:
a xed cost of selling in place l0, which is equal to clfll0, and a transport
cost, which is assumed to take the iceberg transport cost specication, i.e.,
 ll0 [ ll0  1] units to be shipped from place l to l0 for one unit to arrive in
place l0. Henceforth, we use subscript ll0 to represent a trading pair, with the
rst letter denoting the exporting place and the second letter denoting the
importing place.
Given the demand function (2), the optimal price rm i from place l
charges in place l0 is
pll0(i) =
clai

 ll0 : (3)
As a result, the prot that rm i of place l derives from serving place l0 is
ll0(i) = (1  )

 ll0clai
Pl0
1 "
l0El0   clfll0 (4)
and the corresponding export volume is
Rll0(i) =

 ll0clai
Pl0
1 "
l0El0 : (5)
Hence, rm i from place l exports to place l0 if and only if
ll0(i)  0
,
ai 

l0El0(1  )
clfll0
 1
" 1 Pl0
 ll0cl
 all0 : (6)
Clearly, only rms with a su¢ ciently high productivity level are able to
cover their xed and transport costs and export their goods to other places.
The threshold productivity level increases (i.e., a lower level of all0) when
trade costs are higher (i.e.,  ll0 and fll0).
Aggregating the export volume of all rms from place l to place l0 leads
to the total export volume from l to l0 as being
Mll0 =
Z Nl
0
Rll0(i)di = Nl
Z aHl
aLl
Rll0(a)dG(a)
=

Pl0
 ll0cl
" 1
l0El0NlVll0 ; (7)
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where
Vll0 
( R all0
aLl
a1 "dGl(a) 8all0  aLl
0 otherwise
: (8)
Clearly, the export volume increases in demand for exports (l0El0), ex-
port good variety (Nl), and the proportion of exporting rms with above-
threshold productivity (Vll0, which in turn decreases in xed and variable
trade costs, i.e.,  ll0 and fll0), but decreases directly in variable trade costs
( ll0).
3.1.2 Estimation Specication
The export volume from l to l0 derived in equation (7) can be estimated in a
log-linear form, i.e.,
mll0 = ("  1) ln+ [("  1) pl0 + lnl0 + el0 ]
+ [nl   ("  1) ln cl]  ("  1) ln  ll0 + vll0 ; (9)
where lowercase variables represent the natural logarithms of their corre-
sponding uppercase variables.  ll0 captures variable trade costs. Assume
 " 1ll0  Dll0exp
 
zll0 +X
0
ll0 ull0

, where Dll0 is the distance between l and
l0; Xll0 is a vector of other bilateral variable trade costs; and ull0 is an i.i.d.
error term. zll0 is our regressor of interest reecting the severity of the dam-
age caused by the Japanese invasion in di¤erent regions of China. More
serious war damage and its more acute sequelae are expected to raise various
trade costs. For example, average consumers in regions with more severe war
damage are less enthusiastic about Japanese products, which thus sell rela-
tively slowly. Merchants in such regions would bear higher inventory costs
for Japanese products and/or have to provide discounts when selling them.
In the empirical analysis, we measure zll0 by the percentage of civilian ca-
sualties (those who su¤ered minor wounds, severe wounds or died) caused
by the Japanese invasion in each of Chinese regions (variable construction
details are provided in Section 4).
We therefore have the following estimation equation:
mll0 =  + l + l0   dll0   zll0  X
0
ll0 + vll0+ull0 ; (10)
where l is the xed e¤ect of the exporting place, absorbing [nl   ("  1) ln cl];
l0 is the xed e¤ect of the importing place, absorbing [("  1) pl0 + lnl0 + el0 ];
and  is a constant, absorbing (" 1) ln. Consistent estimation of equation
(10) requires a control for vll0 (rm heterogeneity) and the possible correlation
between ull0 and explanatory variables (sample-selection bias).
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Dene a variable Yll0 as
Yll0 
(1  )

Pl0
 ll0cl
" 1
l0El0
 
aLl
1 "
clfll0
; (11)
which is the ratio of variable export prots for the most productive rm
in place l to the xed export cost from l to l0. Hence, we observe positive
exports between places l and l0 only when Yll0 > 1. Similar to the case of the
variable trade cost  ll0, we assume fll0  exp
 
zll0 +W
0
ll0' ll0

, whereWll0
is a vector of other xed trade costs; and ll0 is an i.i.d. error term. Hence,
the latent variable yll0  lnYll0 can be written as
yll0 = { + & l + l0   dll0   ~zll0  X
0
ll0  W
0
ll0'+ll0 ; (12)
where & l is the xed e¤ect of the exporting place, absorbing
 " ln cl + (1  ") ln aLl ;
l0 is the xed e¤ect of the importing place, absorbing [("  1) pl0 + lnl0 + el0 ];
{ is a constant, absorbing ln(1   ); and ll0  ll0 + ull0 is an i.i.d. error
term.
Dene Tll0 to equal 1 when place l exports to l0 and 0 when it does not.
Hence, we have
ll0 = Pr (Tl0l = 1jobserved variables)
= F

{ + & l + l0   dll0   ~zll0  X
0
ll0  W
0
ll0'

; (13)
where F (:) is the cumulative distribution function of ll0. Let ^ll0 be the
predicted value from equation (13) and y^ll0 = F 1(^ll0). Given a distribution
function of G(:) and equation (8), vll0 is a monotonic function of yll0. A
consistent estimate of vll0 can then be derived as
v^ll0 = H(^ll0): (14)
In addition, E [ull0j:; Tll0 = 1] = corr (ull0 ; ll0) (u=) ll0, where a consistent
estimate of ll0 is obtained from the inverse Mills ratio, i.e.,
^ll0 = f(y^ll0)=F (y^ll0)  I(^ll0): (15)
By correcting for rm heterogeneity (equation (14)) and sample-selection
bias (equation (15)), we can consistently estimate equation (10) by using the
following transformed equation
mll0 =  + l + l0   dll0   zll0  X
0
ll0 +B(^ll0)+ell0 ; (16)
where B(^ll0)  H(^ll0) + corr (ull0 ; ll0) (u=) I(^ll0); and ell0 is an i.i.d.
error term satisfying E [ell0j:; Tl0l = 1] = 0.
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3.1.3 Estimation Issues
Equations (13) and (16) constitute our two-stage estimation of the long-
run impact of the Japanese invasion on Sino-Japanese bilateral trade. More
specically, in the rst stage, we estimate equation (13) and investigate
whether the Japanese invasion a¤ects the likelihood of trade between Chinese
regions and Japan (or the extensive margin). In the second stage, we esti-
mate equation (16) and study, conditional on participation in trade, whether
the Japanese invasion a¤ects trade volume (or the intensive margin).
Next, we discuss several estimation issues arising from this two-stage
estimation specication.
First, as our focus here is on the impact of the Japanese invasion on
Sino-Japanese bilateral trade, we restrict the trading pair fl; l0g to combina-
tions comprising a Chinese province-level region (r) and a foreign country
(f). Here, the foreign country includes Japan and at least a reference coun-
try. The inclusion of the reference country (in which zll0 = 0) allows us to
control for all Chinese province-level characteristics such as geographic and
endowment advantages, wage costs, and education levels. Essentially, this
is a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation, in which all regional factors that af-
fect both Sino-Japanese bilateral trade and bilateral trade between China
and the reference country in the same way have been controlled for; whereas
our identication comes from the di¤erential impact caused by the Japanese
invasion. Meanwhile, the e¤ect of zll0 may not solely be interpreted as indi-
cating how the severity of civilian casualties caused by the Japanese invasion
a¤ects the Sino-Japanese bilateral trade, but also as a measure of how Sino-
Japanese bilateral trade di¤ers from bilateral trade between China and the
reference country due to the Japanese invasion. For the choice of reference
country, we use the United States (U.S.) in the benchmark analysis. In
robustness checks, we experiment by including as the reference country Ger-
many, Singapore, and the United Kingdom (U.K.), which are Chinas top
trading partners.12
Second, for the model laid out in the previous section, we focus on the
analysis of one product category, as products are symmetric. The empirical
analysis, however, is carried out with a data set containing a number of
products. Hence, we augment equations (13) and (16) by including product
12It is documented that a large number of Koreans were both enlisted and conscripted
into the Japanese military and participated in the invasion of China. They even earned
a reputation for brutality (see Philip S. Jowett, 2004. Rays of the Rising Sun, West
Midlands: Helion & Company Limited, pp. 34). In fact, Koreans and Chinese traitors
(Hanjian in Chinese) are referred to as second devils(Er Gui Zi in Chinese), with the
Japanese being the rst devils. Hence, the heavy involvement of Koreans in the Japanese
invasion of China precludes the possibility of using South Korea as a reference country.
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dummies (%j and $j), i.e.,
ll0j = F

{ + & l + l0 + %j   dll0   zll0  X
0
ll0  W
0
ll0'

(17)
mll0j =  + l + l0 +$j   dll0   zll0  X
0
ll0 +B(^ll0)+ell0j: (18)
In our data, we can observe trade volume at the HS-8 digit level. However,
due to a lack of computational capacity, we are unable to carry out the non-
linear estimation of equation (17) at such a disaggregated level (as there are
7; 918 product dummies if we dene a product at the HS-8 digit level). As a
compromise, we dene a product at the HS-4 digit level (with 1; 253 product
dummies) in the benchmark analysis. To investigate whether there is any
aggregation bias, in a robustness check, we conduct a linear estimation with
each product dened at the HS-6 digit level (with 5; 453 product dummies).
Third, to estimate equation (17), we rst assume that ll0 follows a normal
distribution and hence use the Probit estimation as in Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein (2008). We then experiment with three alternative estimation
approaches: Logit estimation (a non-linear estimation assuming a logistic
distribution for ll0) OLS estimation (a linear estimation with no prior distri-
bution assumption of ll0), and a semi-nonparametric estimation developed
by Gallant and Nychka (1987) (no prior distribution assumption for ll0).
Fourth, to estimate equation (18), we use a large number of indicator
dummies to approximate an arbitrary functional form of B(:) in as exible
a manner as possible. More specically, we partition the predicted value
^ll0 into a number of bins with an equal number of observations and assign
a bin indicator to every bin. We then replace B(^ll0) with a number of bin
indicator dummies. The compromise involved in using this exible estimation
is that we are not able to distinguish between rm heterogeneity and sample-
selection e¤ects, which are not the key interests of this study. As it is a linear
equation, we use the OLS estimation with 50 or 100 bins to ensure a large
degree of exibility as in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008).
Fifth, in estimating standard errors, we use robust standard errors con-
trolling for clustering at the trading pair fl; l0g level in the rst stage, as our
regressor of interest is at the trading-pair level and product trade within the
same trading pair may thus be correlated. In the second stage, we use boot-
strapped standard errors to correct for the tted regressors in the estimation.
Sixth, to identify the e¤ects in the second stage, we need some variables
that are part of the rst stage only. In other words, we require some variables
to a¤ect the xed trading costs but not to a¤ect the variable trade costs.
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) use regulatory costs of rm entry
and religion. Due to data limitations, we do not observe the di¤erential
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regulatory costs of entry borne by di¤erent foreign rms. Meanwhile, religion
is the same for all trading pairs between a region in China and a foreign
country. We instead use an indicator for the presence of an embassy or
consulate of the foreign country (Japan and the reference country) in each
region in China as the excluded variable in the rst stage. Intuitively, the
existence of an embassy or consulate may help rms resolve information
asymmetry problems to some degree and ease their entry to the market.
However, it may not a¤ect or have a negligible e¤ect on trade volume, as the
latter depends on production costs and market demand.
3.2 Investment
3.2.1 Estimation Model
As we do not observe outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from Chinese
regions to Japan, we focus on the regional distribution of Japanese FDI in
China. To investigate whether the Japanese invasion a¤ects the location
choices of Japanese multinationals in China, we employ the discrete choice
model developed by McFadden (1974).
Let the prot of Japanese multinational f obtained from investing in
region r of China in year t be approximated by
frt = + zr +X
0
rt 1 + frt; (19)
where zr is civilian casualties in region r caused by the Japanese invasion
in 1937-1945; Xrt 1 is a vector of covariates a¤ecting FDI location choice,
including costs of production, the size of the local market, the degree of
agglomeration, the quality of economic institutions and other macro factors in
year t 1 (see the Appendix for a description of these control variables);13 frt
is an error term. In a region that su¤ered heavier civilian casualties during
the Japanese invasion, Japanese multinationals might incur higher costs in
their business operations. For instance, to induce Chinese employees to work
for Japanese-invested rms, a higher wage rate is needed for prospective
employees with equivalent qualications than that paid by foreign invested
rms from other source countries.
Observing the information

zr;X
0
rt 1
	
for all regions, Japanese multina-
tional f at time t chooses to invest in a region when its prot obtained from
investing in that region is the largest among all Chinese regions. More specif-
ically, if we dene Tfrt = 1 if Japanese multinational f invests in region r at
time t, then we have
13Here we choose the value of covariates in year t   1 to alleviate the reverse causality
problem from frt to Xrt 1.
15
pfrt = PrfTfrt = 1jobserved variablesg = Prffrt  fkt 8k 2 Rg
= Prf(frt   fkt)  (zk   zr) + (X0kt 1  X
0
rt 1) 8k 2 Rg; (20)
where R is the set of Chinese regions.
Assuming frt follows a Type I extreme distribution, McFadden (1974)
derives the following explicit solution for pfrt:
pfrt =
exp(zr +X
0
rt 1)P
k2R exp(zk +X
0
kt 1)
: (21)
3.2.2 Estimation Issues
We use the maximum likelihood method to estimate equation (21) regard-
ing the long-run impact of the Japanese invasion on Japanese investment in
China. In what follows, we discuss several empirical analysis issues arising
from the estimation of equation (21).
First, to derive equation (21), we implicitly assume an Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) condition whereby the choice between two alter-
native regions in China is not a¤ected by the inclusion of other alternative
regions in the choice set. However, this could be a strong assumption, as
Chinese regions are quite di¤erent from each other. As robustness checks,
we conduct three tests on satisfaction of the IIA assumption. Following the
literature on FDI location choice (Head, Ries, and Swenson, 1995), we rst
investigate whether our results are a¤ected by the exclusion of certain inu-
ential regions. The second approach is to use the Poisson regression, which
is shown by Guimarães, Figueiredo, and Woodward (2004) to be an e¤ective
way of controlling for the potential IIA violation in FDI location choice. As a
nal check, we explicitly relax the IIA assumption and assume a nested dis-
crete choice structure. More specically, we assume Japanese multinationals
rst consider a super-region area (e.g., coastal versus inland areas of China)
before choosing a particular region within that super-region area.14
Second, as our regressor of interest (zr) varies only at the regional level, we
cannot include regional dummies in the estimation. Consistent estimation of
the e¤ect of zr, however, requires E [frt  zrjobserved variables] = 0, which
could be a very strong assumption without the use of regional dummies. For
14The super-regions are: (1) Northwest (Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Gansu and
Ningxia), (2) Southwest (Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi), (3) Central East (Shanxi, Hebei,
Henan, Anhui and Jiangxi), (4) Central West (Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan and Shaanxi), (5)
Coastal (Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan), and (6) munici-
palities directly under the central government (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai).
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example, Japanese could have encountered more stalwart civilian resistance
(and hence more civilian casualties) in regions with a tradition of xenopho-
bia, which in turn adversely a¤ects the contemporary FDI location choice.
Hence, the negative sign found for zr may not reect the damage caused by
the Japanese invasion, but may instead reect such adverse omitted regional
factors. Rather than nding exogenous variations to instrument zr, we con-
duct a counterfactual analysis. More specically, instead of looking at the
FDI location choices made by Japanese multinationals, we use a sample of
multinationals from Chinas major FDI source countries such as the U.S.,
Germany, Singapore and the U.K.15 Conceptually, if there are some regional
unobservables (not captured by the long list of control variables in Xkt 1)
that are correlated with zr and persist to adversely a¤ect the contemporary
FDI location choice, we may pick up such adverse e¤ects in at least one of
these Chinas major FDI source countries.
Third, the data we use to estimate equation (21) are taken from a survey
of foreign-invested enterprises conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics
of China in 2001. From this survey, we observe the location of each foreign-
invested enterprise in 2001 and its establishment year. Assuming no post-
establishment location change, we can back out the location when the foreign-
invested enterprise invested in China.16 However, if there are substantial
changes of location over the years and/or entry and exit, our estimation could
be biased. As a robustness check, we focus on a sub-sample of Japanese
multinationals that started investing in China in 2001, for which we have
precise information on their location choice at the time of investment.
Fourth, multinationals can invest in China by either setting up wholly-
owned subsidiaries or forming joint ventures with Chinese domestic rms.
Conditional on their formation of joint ventures with local partners, Japanese
multinationals should be less a¤ected by the damage caused by the Japanese
invasion, as local partners may mitigate the hostility of Chinese people to-
ward the Japanese. Following this insight, we divide the whole sample into
two sub-samples comprising a sub-sample of rms wholly owned by Japanese
multinationals and a sub-sample of joint ventures, and test whether the ad-
verse e¤ect of the Japanese invasion is smaller in the latter than in the former.
15These countries are among Chinas top 10 FDI source countries. We also experiment
with other FDI (top 20) source countries for China such as Holland, France, Canada,
Australia, Malaysia and Italy, and do not nd the Japanese invasion to have any signicant
impact on their FDI location choices. To save space, we do not report these results, but
they are available upon request.
16We focus on the 1993-2001 period, because the data on many of the control variables
are not available in the years before 1993, and FDI ows into China began increasing
dramatically only in 1992.
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4 Data
Most of the data used in this study come from the following three sources:
1. China Customs Data in 2001, from which we collect the total bilateral
trade volume between Chinese regions and foreign countries (Japan and
reference countries) at the HS-4 and HS-6 digit industry levels.
2. Survey of foreign-invested enterprises conducted by the National Bu-
reau of Statistics of China in 2001, from which we collect information
on Japanese multinationals and multinationals from Chinas major FDI
source countries.
3. Chinas damage during World War II and Statistical Abstract of the
Republic of China, from which we obtain information on civilian casu-
alties across Chinese regions caused by the Japanese invasion of China
and regional pre-war total population, respectively.
Table 1 presents information on the key variables, including trade between
Chinese regions and Japan in 2001, Japanese direct investment in Chinese
regions, civilian casualties caused by the Japanese invasion and the distance
between Chinese regions and Japan.
Regarding Sino-Japanese trade, it is clear that coastal areas, in partic-
ular regions in the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, are not
only more likely to trade with Japan (measured by the percentage of trade
incidence among HS 4-digit or 6-digit products), but are also more likely to
trade more intensively with Japan. In contrast, inland regions such as Ti-
bet, Qinghai and Ningxia are less likely to trade with Japan and do so less
intensively.
Similarly, coastal regions such as Shanghai, Jiangsu and Shandong receive
the most direct investment from Japan, while Northwestern regions such as
Xinjiang and Qinghai barely receive any direct investment from Japan.
The regressor of interest in this study concerns the severity of damage
caused by the Japanese invasion and its persistent impact to this day. To
capture variations in the severity of damage across Chinese regions, we use
the percentage of civilian casualties. Specically, from Chinas damage dur-
ing World War II, we collect the number of civilians who su¤ered minor
wounds, su¤ered major wounds or died due to the Japanese invasion for dif-
ferent regions in China.17 We then divide the number of civilian casualties
by the total pre-war population obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the
17Note that the three northeastern regions of Helongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning are not
included in the analysis. This is because the data source does not cover these regions. As
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Republic of China to calculate the percentage of civilian casualties (denoted
as Civilian Casualties in all the regression tables).18 Civilian casualties are
often the most direct indicator of the cruelty of a war and are the most
striking measure of losses incurred in the war. Taking advantage of regional
variations in civilian casualties, we are able to capture the di¤erences in war
damage and its sequelae across regions.
Although civilian casualties caused by the Japanese military invasion were
widespread in China, at the same time, owing to the vast size of the country,
there was still a fairly large degree of variation in war atrocities across regions.
Approximately half of the Chinese territories (mostly populous regions) were
occupied by Japan and su¤ered civilian casualties during various conicts.
The unoccupied regions also su¤ered a great deal in various ways such as
from the Japanese air bombing that resulted in civilian casualties. Figure 1
shows the geographic distribution of civilian casualties across China, with the
darker color representing more severe casualties. Clearly, civilian casualties
were concentrated in the central corridor of China, starting with Shanxi
all the way down to Guangxi, passing through Henan, Hubei, Hunan and
Jiangxi. This was because of the strategic intention of the Japanese army to
build a supply line for its war in the Pacic Ocean (so-called Operation Ichi-
Go).19 The central corridor regions also su¤ered most because they formed
the boundary zone between the Chinese resistance regions and the Japanese
occupied areas where conicts occurred frequently. In contrast, there were
far fewer casualties in coastal regions, except in the case of Jiangsu where
the notorious Rape of Nanjing took place. The western part of China, still
under the control of the Kuomintang, also su¤ered far fewer casualties. This
large variation in war casualties and atrocities provides an ideal setting for
our study.
a matter of fact, these three regions were occupied by the Japanese much earlier (1931)
than the rest of China (1937), and were subject to a much less confrontational invasion
strategy (the hijack and then installation of the last emperor of the Qing dynasty as the
puppet ruler of these three regions, collectively called Manchuria) than that taken on the
rest of China.
18A caveat for this data set is that Shanghai was counted geographically as part of
Jiangsu province, while Beijing and Tianjin were treated as part of Hebei. We set the
number of Civilian Casualties for Beijing and Tianjian to be the same as that for Hebei.
However, as Shanghai is historically an immigrant city, we rst use the 2000 population
census to nd the Chinese regions from which Shanghai citizens originally came and then
calculate a weighted average value for Shanghai. Our regression results remain qualita-
tively the same if these three cities are excluded from the analysis.
19For more information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ichi-Go.
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 Trade
5.1.1 Benchmark Results
Benchmark estimation results are reported in Table 2, in which the U.S. is
used as the reference country and the error term (l0l) in the rst stage is
assumed to follow a normal distribution.
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the Probit estimation of equation (17). It
is found that Civilian Casualties has a negative and statistically signicant
estimated coe¢ cient.
This result implies that Chinese regions that su¤ered more civilian ca-
sualties from the Japanese invasion are less likely to engage in trade with
Japan. The economic impacts of the Japanese invasion on the likelihood of
Chinese rms trading with Japan are reported in Columns 1-3 of Table 3.
Specically, for each region in China, we calculate the incremental number
of rms that would have participated in exporting to Japan, importing from
Japan, and either of these two trading relations if Japan had not invaded
China. Our nding implies that a total of 1; 956 rms were missingfrom
Sino-Japanese bilateral trade in 2001 due to the Japanese invasion in 1937-
1945. Meanwhile, distance is found to adversely a¤ect rms likelihood of
trading with Japan and the U.S., in line with the result of Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein (2008).20
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report the OLS estimation of equation (18), in
which 50 or 100 bin dummies are used to approximate B(^l0l), respectively.
Regarding our central issue, Civilian Casualties is found to have negative
and statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cients in both of these specica-
tions. These results imply that Chinese regions that su¤ered more from the
Japanese invasion trade less intensively with Japan. In terms of economic
magnitude, for each region in China, we calculate the increase in the volume
of trade with Japan among existing Chinese exporters and importers if there
had been no Japanese invasion of China in 1937-1945. As shown in Column
4 of Table 3, the Japanese invasion of China caused a total loss of US$4:5
billion in trade volume between China and Japan in 2001. Note that this
20Note that the magnitude of the distance e¤ect (e.g., 0:434) is almost twice as large
as that found by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) (e.g., 0:213). The di¤erence in
estimated magnitude may be attributed to two factors: (1) our analysis is undertaken at a
more disaggregated product level (i.e., HS 4-digit product level) than is that of Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) (aggregated at the country level); (2) our analysis is based
on bilateral trade between a Chinese region and a foreign country, while that of Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008)s is between two countries.
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number represents a lower-bound estimation of the per-year trade loss due to
the Japanese invasion of China. If we take into account the potential trade
volume generated by rms that would have participated in Sino-Japanese
bilateral trade had there been no invasion, the per-year trade loss would be
much larger. If we go beyond a single year of 2001, trade losses are expected
to have been accumulated to a much higher level. Hence, in view of the cu-
mulative loss in trade volume from 1945 (the end of the Japanese invasion)
to 2001 and beyond, the Japanese invasion of China causes a far greater loss
of trade between China and Japan.
In summary, the results presented in Table 2 suggest that the Japanese
invasion of China in the 1930s-1940s has a substantial long-run, adverse im-
pact on Sino-Japanese trade at both the extensive and intensive margins.
5.1.2 Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we conduct several robustness checks of our ndings
presented in Table 2.
Alternative estimation of the rst-stage equation. In the bench-
mark analysis, we assume a normal distribution of the error term in the
rst-stage equation and hence use the Probit estimation accordingly. To
check whether our ndings are sensitive to the particular distribution as-
sumption, we use three alternative estimation methods for the rst-stage
equation: Logit estimation (a non-linear estimation assuming a logistic dis-
tribution of the error term), OLS estimation (a linear estimation with no
prior distribution assumption for the error term), and a semi-nonparametric
estimation developed by Gallant and Nychka (1987) (no prior distribution
assumption for the error term). The estimation results are reported in Table
4. Clearly, our ndings on the long-run adverse impact of the Japanese inva-
sion of China on both the likelihood and volume of Sino-Japanese bilateral
trade are generally robust to these alternative methods for estimating the
rst-stage equation.
Alternative reference countries. In the benchmark analysis, we use
the U.S. as the reference country to control for Chinas regional xed e¤ects.
To check whether our ndings are sensitive to the reference country selected,
we experiment by including more reference countries: Germany, Singapore,
and the U.K. The estimation results are reported in Table 5. It is found that
the inclusion of more reference countries has little impact on our ndings on
the adverse impact of the Japanese invasion.
HS-6 digit level estimation. In the benchmark analysis, due to com-
putational limitations, we dene a product at the HS-4 digit level. To check
whether our ndings are biased due to aggregation problems, we use a linear
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rather than a non-linear estimation of the rst-stage equation (17), in which
the former allows us to include HS-6 digit rather than HS-4 digit product
xed e¤ects. The estimation results are reported in Table 6. Comparing
the estimation results with those obtained using HS-4 digit product xed
e¤ects (Columns 4-6 of Table 4), we nd that the change in the product
disaggregation level has almost no e¤ect on our ndings.
5.2 Investment
5.2.1 Benchmark Results
Benchmark estimation results are reported in Table 7, with the progressive
inclusion of control variables. It is found that in all three specications, Civil-
ian Casualties has negative and statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cients.
These results imply that Chinese regions that su¤ered more from Japanese
invasion in the 1930s-1940s accommodate fewer contemporary Japanese in-
vestments.
To assess the economic signicance of the impact of the Japanese invasion
on the FDI location choice, we follow the method used by Head, Ries, and
Swenson (1995). Specically, their method shows that the average proba-
bility elasticity with respect to the impact of the Japanese invasion has the
following form
Ez = ^
R  1
R
; (22)
where ^ is the estimated coe¢ cient of civilian casualties; and R is the total
number of regions. Using our most conservative estimate (Column 3 of Table
7), we nd that if civilian casualties decrease by 10%, the probability of
investment by Japanese multinationals increases by 1%. Meanwhile, if there
had been no Japanese invasion (in other words, civilian casualties decrease
by 100%), the probability of investment by Japanese multinationals would
increase by 10%.
The results for the control variables all make economic sense. More specif-
ically, it is found that Japanese multinationals prefer to invest in regions
geographically closer to Japan with a larger market size, a better quality la-
bor force, better infrastructure, greater degrees of agglomeration of Japanese
rms and domestic Chinese rms, better economic institutions (such as intel-
lectual property rights protection), and more favorable government policies
(such as special economic zones, or national economic development zones). It
is clear that the magnitude of the impact of civilian casualties is much larger
than that of wages and education, and is similar to that of local economic
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institutions. This shows the importance of historical legacy in a¤ecting the
location choice of FDI.
5.2.2 Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we conduct several robustness checks of our ndings
reported in Table 7.
Checks on the IIA assumption. In estimating the benchmark equa-
tion (21), we need the IIA assumption to be satised (i.e., the choice between
two alternatives should not be a¤ected by the inclusion of other alternatives).
We conduct three tests to check whether our ndings are sensitive to the im-
position of the IIA assumption. First, we exclude regions fewer than 10
Japanese multinationals have entered (Guizhou, Gansu, Hainan, Xinjiang
and Qinghai) in Column 1 of Table 8, and exclude the three regions in which
the most Japanese multinationals have entered (Shanghai, Shandong, and
Jiangsu) in Column 2 of Table 8. Second, we use the Poisson estimation
in Column 3 of Table 8, which is shown to more e¤ectively control for po-
tential IIA violation in FDI location decisions (Guimarães, Figueiredo, and
Woodward, 2004). Third, we explicitly relax the IIA assumption and in-
stead propose a nested structure in Column 4 of Table 8, in which Japanese
multinationals rst consider a super-region area before selecting a particular
region within that super-region area. We conclude that our ndings on the
negative impact of the Japanese invasion on Japanese investments remain
robust to all three alternative estimation specications.
Counterfactual analysis. As our regressor of interest varies at the re-
gional level, we are unable to include regional xed e¤ects in the benchmark
estimation. Instead, we include a list of control variables commonly used in
the literature on FDI location choice, and assume a conditional orthogonal-
ity of civilian casualties, i.e., E [frt  zrjobserved variables] = 0. To check
whether our ndings are biased due to the imposition of this assumption,
we conduct a counterfactual analysis. Conceptually, if some omitted re-
gional variables are correlated with zr and have a persistently adverse e¤ect
on contemporary FDI location choices, we may nd such an adverse e¤ect
in samples of multinationals from other countries. More specically, civil-
ian casualties might reect some uncontrolled and/or unobservable regional
characteristics that a¤ect FDI inow. For instance, higher civilian casualties
indicate higher physical and human capital costs brought about by the war,
which might lower the regions potential for economic growth and make the
region unattractive to FDI. Also, for example, as noted above, higher civilian
casualties might reect the existence of more serious xenophobia among local
residents. If civilian casualties really capture these factors, they should not
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only a¤ect FDI from Japan, but should also exert strong negative impacts on
FDI from other source countries. In Table 9, we examine the impact of civil-
ian casualties caused by the Japanese invasion on FDI location choice using
samples from the U.S., Singapore, Germany and the U.K., respectively. It is
found that none of these regressions shows any statistically signicant and
negative impact of civilian casualties; three coe¢ cients have a positive sign,
and one has a negative sign but is statistically insignicant. Interestingly,
we nd that U.S. multinationals invest more in regions that su¤ered more
from the Japanese invasion. It is possible that in regions where the Japanese
invasion caused more civilian casualties, the United States is perceived as
a savior (through its nuclear bombing of Japan and provision of military
aid to China), and hence local Chinese people have a more favorable view
of Americans and more direct investment from the United States. Alterna-
tively, because the industrial structure of the U.S. is highly similar to that
of Japan, there is substitution between Japanese and U.S. multinationals.
Sub-sample of year 2001. The analysis thus far utilizes a survey of
foreign invested enterprises conducted in 2001 to extrapolate location in-
formation in the 1993-2001 period. If location changes and/or entry and
exit occurred during this period, we may face a measurement error prob-
lem and/or sample selection bias. To check whether our ndings are biased
due to these problems, we focus on a sub-sample of Japanese multinationals
established in 2001 so that we can have precise location information. The es-
timation results are reported in Table 10. Clearly, we still nd the Japanese
invasion has a negative and statistically signicant impact on the location
choice of Japanese direct investment. However, the increase in the estimated
magnitude of this impact does suggest potential measurement errors and/or
a sample selection issue, which causes an under-estimation in our benchmark
analysis.
Joint-venture versus wholly-owned. We conduct a conceptual ex-
periment as a further check on our ndings on the impact of the Japanese in-
vasion. In the data, there are two forms of Japanese multinationals in China:
Japanese wholly-owned subsidiaries and Sino-Japanese joint ventures. Con-
ceptually, local partners of Sino-Japanese joint ventures should alleviate some
of the hostility among local Chinese people toward Japanese investment. In-
deed, we nd in Table 11 that the impact of the Japanese invasion on the
location choices of Japanese multinationals is smaller for Sino-Japanese joint
ventures than for Japanese wholly-owned subsidiaries.
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5.3 Discussion of Results
Our analysis demonstrates that the Japanese invasion of China exerts neg-
ative e¤ects on bilateral trade and investment, even though more than six
decades have passed since the war came to an end. There could be various
a priori reasons for war damage deterring bilateral trade and investment.
Some examples are as follows. First, the war could have damaged physi-
cal infrastructure, transportation facilities and production capacity, thereby
adversely a¤ecting trade and investment. Second, the war resulted in tremen-
dous casualties and thus heavy losses of human capital. As a result, there
is a shortage of capable human resources to organize production, trade and
investment. Third, the physical and human capital losses incurred in the
war sent various regions into a poverty trap, which retarded their subsequent
development for a long period. Fourth, the war could have damaged the nat-
ural environment of a particular region, thereby hampering its socioeconomic
development. These possible scenarios are, however, unlikely to account for
the long-term impact of the war in our context. If the damage caused by the
Sino-Japanese war undermined regional capacity for economic development,
it is also likely to have negative impacts on bilateral trade and investment be-
tween Chinese regions and any major trading partner and FDI source country
other than Japan. Nonetheless, our analysis shows forcefully that this is not
the case. This indicates that the sequelae of war damage are not generally
reected in a lower ability among regions to foster economic development.
Instead, they are quite specic to economic relations with Japan.
In our opinion, the most plausible interpretation of the long-term impacts
of the war is that the war has created chronic sequelae that are primarily
psychological in nature. As noted above, the Japanese invasion of China in
the 1930s and 1940s remains a root cause for the unfavorable view of Japan
held by the majority of Chinese people. The apparent lack of sincere re-
morse for the war on the Japanese side and the rising nationalism tolerated
by the Chinese Communist government contribute to the unfavorable atti-
tude of many Chinese toward Japan. Lingering war memories might well
exert a negative impact on peoples willingness to expand bilateral trade and
investment. According to the China Topline Report of Global Views 2006
released by the Chicago Council on Global A¤airs, 31% of the Chinese peo-
ple surveyed were against China having a free trade agreement with Japan,
whereas the corresponding gure for those opposing a free trade agreement
with the U.S. was 19%. Similarly, 58% of the Chinese surveyed did not agree
that Japanese companies should be allowed to purchase a controlling stake
in Chinese companies, whereas the corresponding gure for EU countries
was 33%. Hence, such persistent sequelae of the war may adversely a¤ect
25
the willingness of Chinese people to restore and expand bilateral trade and
investment connections with Japan.
This interpretation of the results is reinforced by the measure of war dam-
age employed in our study. Civilian casualties are expected to be particularly
powerful in capturing the psychological sequelae of the war. Unlike property
damage and losses incurred in the war, the negative e¤ects of human casual-
ties are often irreversible and long-lasting. Furthermore, in comparison with
military casualties, civilian casualties are much more likely to produce long
memories of war atrocities within a local community. Military troops were
typically made up of service personnel from di¤erent parts of the country.
Civilians were much less mobile. They often had extended family relations
and social networks in the local area, and most of them remained in the
province from one generation to another. Injury or death among their family
members and friends during the War could cast a shadow on the hearts of the
family and the local community for a long time. Consequently, unfavorable
views of or even animosity toward Japan could persist across generations.
Hence, we expect residents in regions with more civilian casualties to have a
more unfavorable view of Japan on average.
The long-term impacts of the war uncovered in our study focus on rel-
ative performance, i.e., the shortfall in trade and investment compared with
a scenario whereby no such war occurred or war disputes had been resolved.
These are more subtle consequences of the war than are the short-term im-
pacts of wars on economic performance in the immediate years following the
conict. The literature to date does not reveal that wars have much of a
long-term impact. For example, Davis and Weinstein (2002) nd no long-
term impact of the U.S. bombing of Japanese cities during World War II on
the populations of these cities in the post-war period. Similarly, Miguel and
Roland (2011) nd that the U.S. bombing in the VietnamWar did not lead to
a persistent local poverty trap. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi
(2000) also nd rapid postwar recovery in a cross-country study. In terms of
the e¤ects of wars on trade, Glick and Taylor (2010) nd that the negative
impacts of wars on trade ows dissipated nearly ten years after the wars had
come to an end. The di¤erences between our ndings and those reported
in the literature primarily stem from the fact that existing studies focus on
declines in the output level, trade volume and other economic performance
indicators caused by wars and on the postwar recovery of these indicators,
whereas our study sheds light on the shortfall in trade and investment per-
formance compared with the counterfactual benchmark scenario whereby no
such war occurred. Hence, our study adds to the literature by revealing a
deeper layer of costs imposed by the war on economic growth.
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6 Conclusion
Research on international trade and investment tends to focus on economic
factors such as comparative advantage, market size and geographic distance.
The impacts of non-economic factors such as political, sociological and his-
torical inuences are often overlooked. A prominent feature of todays world
is conict among countries or races. Whether conict adversely a¤ects in-
ternational trade and investment is a crucial issue for us to understand in
this increasingly globalized world. Several existing studies focus on how con-
ict reduces trade ows in the years immediately following the war and how
fast trade ows recover. Nevertheless, it is equally important to understand
whether past conicts among countries generate long-term impacts and af-
fect contemporary trade and investment among them, not only in terms of
the absolute level of trade and investment ows, but also in terms of their
relative level. That is, whether historical conicts cause current economic
exchange to fall short of the level that could have been reached if there were
no war-induced animosity is a key issue. This paper utilizes one of the most
important historical conicts in Asia in the last 100 years, the Japanese in-
vasion of China from 1937 to 1945, to examine whether it has any adverse
impact on contemporary trade between the two countries and direct invest-
ment from Japan.
To measure the severity of damage brought by the Japanese invasion, we
collect data on the percentage of civilian casualties for 28 regions in China.
For estimating the impact on trade between China and Japan, we apply an
augmented gravity model developed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein
(2008) to 2001 China Customs data. It is found that the invasion has led
to not only smaller numbers of rms participating in trade between Japan
and Chinese regions (the extensive margin e¤ect), but also lower trade vol-
umes (the intensive margin e¤ect). To estimate the impact of the invasion
on foreign direct investment from Japan, we apply the discrete choice model
developed by McFadden (1974) to 2001 data on foreign-invested enterprises.
It is found that regions that su¤ered more severe losses from the Japanese
invasion attract smaller numbers of Japanese-invested enterprises. Our study
shows that historical animosity still matters for international trade and in-
vestment, despite the trend toward a at world.
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Table 1: Information of key variables 
 
China’s 
Regions 
Trade with Japan Investment
from Japan 
 
(number) 
Civilian Casualties 
  
 
(%) 
Distance
Volume 
 
(m US$) 
HS 4‐digit non‐zeros 
 
HS 6‐digit non‐zeros 
 
 
 
(km) 
Anhui  608.2  0.49  0.26  64  1.75  2113.0 
Beijing  4167.9  0.80  0.59  288  1.24  2090.4 
Chongqing  175.7  0.29  0.12 ‐ 0.07  3163.1
Fujian  4249.9  0.71  0.49 169 0.47  2215.1
Gansu  148.7  0.11  0.04 7 0.02  3223.9
Guangdong  23345.8  0.85  0.71 266 1.27  2904.6
Guangxi  200.1  0.32  0.13 26 7.08  3342.4
Guizhou  116.9  0.15  0.05 10 0.67  3282.4
Hainan  281.5  0.31  0.13 9 0.00  3550.6
Hebei  924.6  0.62  0.37  170  1.24  2253.4 
Henan  433.2  0.41  0.18  52  2.89  1567.4 
Hubei  770.2  0.43  0.22 55 5.08  2427.6
Hunan  404.6  0.38  0.18 20 4.57  2644.0
Inner 
Mongolia 
227.6  0.23  0.08 31 1.44  2504.6
Jiangsu  14441.2  0.83  0.69 985 2.37  1971.3
Jiangxi  271.3  0.34  0.15 34 3.41  2366.3
Ningxia  96.8  0.14  0.05  11  0.57  2966.4 
Qinghai  50.7  0.05  0.02  2  0.00  3389.2 
Shaanxi  417.7  0.41  0.19 50 0.02  2795.8
Shandong  7620.2  0.82  0.62 648 0.83  2037.4
Shanghai  14807.6  0.87  0.73 1118 2.09  1760.4
Shanxi  472.3  0.24  0.09 26 5.81  2424.7
Sichuan  803.8  0.49  0.26 109 0.09  3345.6
Tianjin  4063.7  0.77  0.56 294 1.24  2020.0
Tibet  7.8  0.05  0.01  ‐  0.00  4538.5 
Xinjiang  148.5  0.11  0.04  2  0.00  4463.1 
Yunnan  176.4  0.28  0.11 17 0.65  3714.4
Zhejiang  6747.5  0.77  0.59 508 1.38  1915.0
 
   
Table 2: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Sino‐Japanese 
bilateral trade, Benchmark results 
 
  1  2  3 
  First Stage Second Stage 
    50 bins  100 bins 
Reference Country  U.S.
Estimation Method  Probit OLS
Civilian Casualties  ‐0.013** ‐0.040** ‐0.033* 
  (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) 
Log of Distance  ‐0.434*** ‐1.565*** ‐1.427*** 
  (0.072) (0.166) (0.166) 
Excluded Variable       
Embassy or Consulates  0.178***  
  (0.015)     
Firm Heterogeneity and Selection Bias      
50 Bins Dummies  Yes  
100 Bins Dummies  Yes 
Other Controls   
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Importer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Product Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Industries  1253 1253 1253 
Number of China’s Regions  28  28  28 
Number of Foreign Countries  2  2  2 
Pseudo R2/R2  0.43  0.34  0.34 
Log pseudo likelihood  ‐48741 ‐ ‐ 
Observations  136976 42637 42637 
Note:  Robust‐standard  errors,  clustered  at  region‐country  pair  level,  are  reported  in  the 
parenthesis in Column 1; whereas bootstrapped standard errors are reported in Columns 2‐
3. ** and *** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
   
Table 3: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Sino‐Japanese bilateral trade, 
Magnitude in the Year of 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1  2 3 4 
  Number of “Missed“ Firms Increase in Trade Volume 
by Existing Exporters and 
Importers 
  Export  Import  Export or Import  (US$ million) 
Anhui  9.5  8.7  18.2  35.1 
Beijing  17.5  67  84.5  170.5 
Chongqing  0.1  0.2 0.3 0.4 
Fujian  15  15.3 30.3 65.9 
Gansu  0.01  0.01 0.02 0.1 
Guangdong  104  289.8 393.8 978.4 
Guangxi  22.1  14.4 36.5 46.8 
Guizhou  0.5  0.5  1  2.6 
Hainan  0  0  0  0 
Hebei  9.8  13  22.8  37.8 
Henan  9.9  8.6 18.5 41.3 
Hubei  14.7  26.9 41.6 129.1 
Hunan  12.2  16.2 28.4 61 
Inner Mongolia  2.6  1.6 4.2 10.8 
Jiangsu  151.2  295.9 447.1 1129 
Jiangxi  7.7  6.5  14.2  30.5 
Ningxia  0.3  0.4  0.7  1.8 
Qinghai  0  0  0  0 
Shaanxi  0.05  0.08 0.13 0.3 
Shandong  43  48.3 91.3 208.7 
Shanghai  142.7  355.8 498.5 1021 
Shanxi  9.3  6.1 15.4 90.6 
Sichuan  0.4  0.7 1.1 2.4 
Tianjin  18.2  54.1  72.3  166.3 
Tibet  0  0  0  0 
Xinjiang  0  0  0  0 
Yunnan  1.6  0.9 2.5 3.8 
Zhejiang  69.9  63.5 133.4 307.3 
Total  662.3  1294.5 1956.8 4541.5 
Table 4: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Sino‐Japanese bilateral trade, Alternative estimation of the first‐stage 
 
  1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 
  First Stage  Second Stage  First Stage  Second Stage  First Stage  Second Stage 
  50 bins 100 bins 50 bins  100 bins 50 bins 100 bins 
Reference Country  U.S.  U.S.  U.S. 
Estimation Method Logit OLS OLS OLS Semi‐nonparametric OLS
Civilian Casualties  ‐0.021  ‐0.041**  ‐0.036**  ‐0.003**  ‐0.045**  ‐0.045**  ‐0.008*  ‐0.036**  ‐0.035** 
  (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.002) (0.018)  (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.014) 
Log of Distance ‐0.880*** ‐1.701*** ‐1.550*** ‐0.091*** ‐1.565*** ‐1.567*** ‐0.446*** ‐1.666*** ‐1.590*** 
  (0.125) (0.169) (0.160) (0.015) (0.147)  (0.161) (0.040) (0.177) (0.210) 
Excluded Variable  
Embassy or Consulates  0.306***      0.042***      0.140***     
(0.035) (0.004)   (0.019)
Firm  Heterogeneity  and 
Selection Bias 
                 
50 Bins Dummies Yes Yes  Yes
100 Bins Dummies Yes   Yes Yes 
Other Controls  
Exporter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Industries 1253 1253 1253 1253 1253  1253 1253 1253 1253 
Number of China’s Regions  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28 
Number of Foreign Countries  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Pseudo R2/R2  0.43  0.34  0.34  0.43  0.34  0.34    0.34  0.34 
Log pseudo likelihood ‐48533   ‐48311
Observations 140336 42637 42637 136640 42637  42637 140336 42637 42637 
Note: Robust‐standard errors, clustered at region‐country pair level, are reported in the parenthesis in Columns 1, 4 and 7; whereas bootstrapped standard errors are reported in Columns 2‐3, 5‐
6, and 8‐9. ** and *** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Sino‐Japanese bilateral trade, more reference countries 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
  First Stage  Second Stage  First Stage  Second Stage  First Stage  Second Stage 
  50 bins 100 bins 50 bins 100 bins 50 bins 100 bins
Reference Countries  U.S. and Germany  U.S., Germany and Singapore  U.S., Germany, Singapore, and U.K. 
Estimation Method  Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
Civilian Casualties  ‐0.027***  ‐0.064***  ‐0.062***  ‐0.027***  ‐0.060***  ‐0.056***  ‐0.028***  ‐0.050***  ‐0.048*** 
  (0.001) (0.016) (0.017) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Log of Distance ‐0.460*** ‐1.475*** ‐1.451*** ‐0.380*** ‐1.151*** ‐1.093*** ‐0.409*** ‐1.190*** ‐1.155*** 
  (0.072) (0.125) (0.145) (0.059) (0.097) (0.107) (0.060) (0.090) (0.098)
Excluded Variable 
Embassy or Consulates  0.113**      0.119***      0.113**     
(0.047) (0.041) (0.047)
Firm  Heterogeneity  and 
Selection Bias 
                 
50 Bins Dummies  Yes Yes Yes
100 Bins Dummies  Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Product Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Industries  1253 1253 1253 1253 1253 1253 1253 1253 1253
Number of China’s Regions  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28 
Number of Foreign Countries  3  3  3  4  4  4  5  5  5 
Pseudo R2/R2  0.43  0.33  0.34  0.43  0.33  0.33  0.43  0.32  0.32 
Log pseudo likelihood  ‐70177 ‐80735 ‐99245
Observations 205632 58308 58308 240492 65527 65527 309204 77041 77041
Note: Robust‐standard errors, clustered at region‐country pair  level, are reported  in the parenthesis  in Columns 1, 4 and 7; whereas bootstrapped standard errors are reported  in 
Columns 2‐3, 5‐6, and 8‐9. ** and *** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Sino‐Japanese 
bilateral trade, HS‐6 digit estimation 
 
  1  2  3 
  First Stage Second Stage 
    50 bins  100 bins 
Reference Country  U.S.
Estimation Method  OLS OLS
Civilian Casualties  ‐0.004** ‐0.045*** ‐0.048*** 
  (0.001) (0.012) (0.013) 
Log of Distance  ‐0.099*** ‐1.708*** ‐1.762*** 
  (0.015) (0.097) (0.105) 
Excluded Variable       
Embassy or Consulates  0.031***  
  (0.008)     
Firm Heterogeneity and Selection Bias      
50 Bins Dummies  Yes  
100 Bins Dummies  Yes 
Other Controls   
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Importer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HS‐6 digit Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Industries  1253 1253 1253 
Number of China’s Regions  28  28  28 
Number of Foreign Countries  2  2  2 
R2  0.35  0.31  0.31 
Observations  610736 103497 103497 
Note: Robust‐standard errors, clustered at region‐country pair level, are reported in the 
parenthesis in Column 1; whereas bootstrapped standard errors are reported in Columns 2‐
3. ** and *** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Japanese investment in China, 
Benchmark results 
 
  1  2  3 
Civilian Casualties  ‐0.150***  ‐0.127***  ‐0.097*** 
  (0.013) (0.019) (0.021) 
Log of Distance   ‐6.739***  ‐3.959***  ‐3.634*** 
  (0.122)  (0.119)  (0.155) 
Economic Institutions   
Government Intervention in Business Operations ‐0.180 ‐0.761 
  (0.682) (0.725) 
Intellectual Property Right Protection 0.148*** 0.105*** 
    (0.038)  (0.040) 
Agglomeration  
Agglomeration of Japanese Firms    2.008***  1.950*** 
    (0.100)  (0.100) 
Agglomeration of Chinese Firms  3.808*** 3.826*** 
  (0.211) (0.212) 
Cost of Production   
Wage  0.055*** 0.011 
    (0.012)  (0.016) 
Education  0.020** 0.040*** 
    (0.010)  (0.011) 
Infrastructure    0.357  ‐0.386 
  (0.217) (0.275) 
Market Demand  
Gross Domestic Product  0.307*** 0.249*** 
  (0.014) (0.015) 
Other Macro Factors       
Presence of Japanese Embassy or Consulates 0.333*** 
      (0.094) 
Special Economic Zone      0.363*** 
  (0.080) 
National Economic Development Zone 0.152* 
(0.080) 
Number of Choices  26 26 26 
Number of Firms 4971 4971 4971 
Pseudo R2  0.21 0.29 0.29 
Log pseudo likelihood  ‐12876 ‐11554 ‐11508 
Observations  129246  129246  129246 
Note:  Robust‐standard  errors  are  reported  in  the  parenthesis.  *  and  ***  represent  statistical 
significance at 10% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Japanese investment in China, Checks on IIA assumption 
 
 1 2 3 4
Estimation Method  Conditional Logit  Poisson Nested Logit
Sample  Excluding regions with less
than 10 entries 
Excluding regions with the top 
three entries 
Whole Whole
Civilian Casualties   ‐0.121*** ‐0.091*** ‐0.259*** ‐0.123***
  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.091)  (0.027) 
Control Variables         
Log of Distance  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Institutions  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Agglomeration  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cost of Production  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Demand  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Macro Factors  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Choices  21  23  26  26 
Number of Firms  4941 2220 4971 4971
Pseudo R2  0.25 0.24
Log pseudo likelihood  ‐11265  ‐5263    ‐1144 
Observations  103761 51060 234 129246
Note: Robust‐standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. *** represents statistical significance at 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Japanese investment in China, 
Counterfactual analysis 
 
 1  2  3  4 
Sample  U.S. Singapore Germany U.K. 
Civilian Casualties  0.057*** 0.042 0.017 ‐0.042 
  (0.013) (0.028) (0.065) (0.072) 
Control Variables         
Log of Distance  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Economic Institutions  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agglomeration  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cost of Production Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market Demand  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Macro Factors  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Choices  26 26 26 26 
Number of Firms  6944  2409  948  924 
Pseudo R2  0.54 0.70 0.87 0.85 
Log pseudo likelihood  ‐10348  ‐2327  ‐414  ‐444 
Observations  180544 62634 24648 24024 
Note: Robust‐standard errors are  reported  in  the parenthesis. ***  represent  statistical  significance at 1% 
level.  
 
   
Table 10: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Japanese investment in China, 
Sub‐sample of year 2001 
 
 1 
Sample  Year 2001
Civilian Casualties  ‐0.221***
  (0.079)
Control Variables   
Log of Distance  Yes 
Economic Institutions  Yes
Agglomeration  Yes 
Cost of Production Yes
Market Demand  Yes
Other Macro Factors  Yes
Number of Choices  26
Number of Firms  602 
Pseudo R2  0.37
Log pseudo likelihood  ‐1227 
Observations  15652
Note: Robust‐standard errors are reported  in  the parenthesis. *** represents statistical significance at 1% 
level.  
 
   
Table 11: Impact of the Japanese invasion of China on the Japanese investment in China, 
Joint‐venture versus wholly‐owned 
 
 1  1 
Sample  Joint‐venture Wholly‐owned 
Civilian Casualties  ‐0.068*** ‐0.188*** 
  (0.024) (0.041) 
Control Variables     
Log of Distance  Yes  Yes 
Economic Institutions  Yes Yes 
Agglomeration  Yes  Yes 
Cost of Production Yes Yes 
Market Demand  Yes Yes 
Other Macro Factors  Yes Yes 
Number of Choices  26 26 
Number of Firms  3315  1656 
Pseudo R2  ‐7845 ‐3615 
Log pseudo likelihood  0.27  0.33 
Observations  86190 43056 
Note: Robust‐standard errors are reported  in  the parenthesis. *** represents statistical significance at 1% 
level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Geographic pattern of civilian casualties in China 
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Appendix: Description of control variables 
 
  Variable  Construction  Source 
Log of Distance  Log of distance the great circle distance between the capital city of a region and Tokyo of Japan  Wikipedia 
Government Intervention in 
Business Operations 
The proportion of entrepreneurs requesting government help in case of business disputes 
in a region 
Survey  of  China's  Private 
Enterprises 
Intellectual Property Right 
Protection 
The logarithm of the number of approved patents per capita in a region  China Statistical Yearbook 
Agglomeration of Japanese Firms  The number of Japanese‐invested firms belonging to a 4‐digit industry located in a region divided by the national 
total of the same industry 
2001  NBS  survey  of  foreign‐
invested enterprises  
Agglomeration of Chinese Firms  The number of China's domestic firms belonging to a 4‐digit industry located in a region divided by the national 
total of the same industry 
NBS annual Survey of 
industrial firms 
Wage   The average of manufacturing wages in a region  China Statistical Yearbook 
Education  the  proportion  of  the  number  of  students  enrolled  in  higher  education  institutions  in  a  region  to  its  total 
population 
China Statistical Yearbook 
Infrastructure  The length of highway per square kilometer in a region  China Statistical Yearbook 
Gross Domestic Product  Regional GDP figure in the year before the FDI project took place  China Statistical Yearbook 
Presence of Japan Embassy or 
Consulates 
A dummy variable taking value one if there is Japanese embassy or consulate in the concerned region, and zero 
otherwise 
History of the diplomatic 
establishment between China 
and United States 1786–1994, 
Huang Gang, 1995 Taiwan 
Special Economic Zone  A dummy variable taking value one  if a region has either special economic zone or open coastal city, and zero 
otherwise 
Comprehensive statistical data 
and materials on 50 years of new 
china 1949–1999, NBS, 1999 
National Economic Development 
Zone 
A dummy variable taking value one if a region has national economic and technological development zone, and 
zero otherwise 
Ministry of Commerce of China 
 
 
